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INCE 1953 the Soviet Union has radically altered its policy concern-
ing the United Nations’ work in the field of international trade. The
U.S.S.R. apparently has developed an increased interest in this work
and has played a much more active role in it. Soviet representatives now
participate in many United Nations’ organs which they previously boy-
cotted, and their speeches and actions lack the stridently propagandistic
tone which characterized those of Soviet delegates in an earlier period. The
U.S.S.R. has even attempted to seize the initiative in some areas through
the introduction of new, f ar-reaching proposals.
These Soviet actions could offer opportunities for expanding the United
Nations’ work in international trade. They could also threaten Western
dominance of this work and American leadership in it, which until recently
have been unchallenged. Further, as these actions involve an increased role
for communist countries whose attitude toward international trade is dif-
ferent from that of noncommunist countries - particularly from that of the
United States - they necessarily will affect the United Nations’ work, con-
ceivably modifying its orientation. Therefore, they deserve careful examina-
tion and consideration.
Perhaps the new Soviet policy can more easily be understood by view-
ing it in its historical context. This might help to clarify the policy’s under-
lying rationale and motivations and to facilitate evaluation of its possible
impact. For analysis, Soviet policy concerning the United Nations’ work
in international trade can be divided into three periods. ( 1 ) During the
world organization’s formative stages from 1944 through 1947, the Soviets
abstained from most of the UN’s activities. (2) During the height of the
cold war from 1948 through 1952, the Soviets continued their abstention
from the actual work of the UN, but also used the organization as a forum
for violent criticism of Western policy. (3) During the period since 1953,
the Soviets have assumed a vastly increased role in the UN’s activities, al-
though they have not completely abandoned their earlier policies of absten-
tion and criticism.
II
The United Nations’ early activities in the field of international trade
dealt primarily with the creation of specialized agencies, which it was antici-
pated would conduct most of the actual work. These activities were based
on the assumption that the United Nations’ goal should be the expansion
of international trade on as free and as multilateral a basis as possible.
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American planners especially held this view, and, because of the dominant
position of the United States, they had little difficulty in gaining its accept-
ance. These Americans thought that the achievement of this goal would
not only be valuable in itself, but that it would also be &dquo;essential to the
attainment of full and effective employment in the United States and else-
where, to the preservation of private enterprise, and to the success of an
international system to prevent future wars Three specialized agencies
were thought to be necessary for the realization of the United Nations’ goal:
one to aid in stabilizing currencies; another to lend money for reconstruc-
tion and development purposes; and a third to regulate commercial policy
and work toward the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.
Two of the planned specialized agencies, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), were created even before the United Nations. Although the
Soviet Union did not join either, it did participate in drafting their Charters
at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and in earlier informal discus-
sions concerning them. In these negotiations Soviet delegates appear to
have had little interest in the broad objectives of the Fund and the Bank.2 2
Instead, they were mainly concerned with matters which would directly
affect the U.S.S.R.: the cost of participation; the availability of credits; the
extent of the organizations’ control over the Soviet economy; and con-
versely, the extent of Soviet control over the organizations’ activities.
Soviet representatives raised these same issues in later discussions of the
two agencies in the United Nations.3 Although concessions have been
made to the Soviet position, the organizations’ fundamental structures and
purposes have never been altered.
An International Trade Organization (ITO) was to have been the third
specialized agency in this field. As a result of American initiative steps were
taken toward its creation at the first session of the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) in the spring of 1946. The U.S.S.R. supported the
initial resolution passed then, but did not attend the subsequent confer-
ences in London, Geneva, and Havana. Nor did Soviet delegates partici-
1 "Summary of the Interim Report of the Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Bar-
riers," in Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, Department of State Publica-
tion 3580, General Foreign Policy Series 15 (1949), p. 622.
2 See Raymond F. Mikesell, "Negotiating at Bretton Woods, 1944," in Raymond Dennett
and Joseph E. Johnson (eds.), Negotiating with the Russians (Boston: World Peace
Foundation, 1951), pp. 101-16.
3 One instance of this occurred during the discussions of the agreements between the
UN and the IMF and the IBRD. Soviet delegates then strongly objected to the
special status given these agencies and the lack of UN control over them. See: United
Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (5th session), pp. 269-70;
United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, (2nd session, Joint Second and
Third Committee), pp. 12-14, 31-32; and United Nations, General Assembly, Official
Records (2nd session, Plenary Meetings), pp. 952-53.
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pate significantly in ECOSOC’s step-by-step discussions of these confer-
ences.
One authority maintains that because of the U.S.S.R.’s failure to partici-
pate in the negotiations some of the proposals concerning state-controlled
economies were dropped from the ITO, or Havana, Charter and that the
sanctions against non-members were reduced.4 Neither the Soviet Union’s
abstention, nor her later attack on the Havana Charter, however, was a
basic cause of the instrument’s failure to obtain the necessary ratifications.
Its nature as a compromise document which fully satisfied no one and the
lack of American support was chiefly responsible for this.
There could be several explanations for the Soviet Union’s abstention
from the United Nations’ activities concerning international trade during
this early period. The U.S.S.R. could not have been expected to be inter-
ested in either their direct or indirect goals. While the UN sought to ex-
pand international trade on as free and as multilateral a basis as possible,
communist doctrine stressed the necessity of self-sufficiency, and much of
the U.S.S.R.’s economic policy had been directed toward this end.5 5 The
trade which the Soviet Union engaged in was generally aimed at securing
imports necessary to implement economic development programs, or at
securing political advantages. Both ends usually can best be achieved
through bilateral rather than multilateral trade. Nor could the Soviet
Union have been very enthusiastic about preserving private enterprise and
maintaining full employment in the United States and other Western coun-
tries, two indirect goals which underlay the American desire for expanded
multilateral trade.
Even the planned technical work of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies could have been of little interest to the Soviet Union,
for it had almost no application to a situation where foreign trade is con-
trolled by a state monopoly, as it is in the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, member-
ship in any of the three specialized agencies might have involved some
slight degree of outside control over Soviet economic policies and would
have required the disclosure of then secret information. Then too, the
United Nation’s activities with their global orientation might have inter-
fered with attempts to unify the Soviet bloc. The fact that the satellites
eventually also withdrew from these activities could be evidence that the
Soviet elite thought that such interference might have occurred.
4 Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949), passim and
especially pp. 101-2 and 162-64.
5 See: Alexander Baykov, Soviet Foreign Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1946); Harry Schwartz, Russia’s Soviet Economy (2d ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall,
1954), chapter 14; Willis C. Armstrong, "The Soviet Approach to International
Trade," Political Science Quarterly, LXIII (September, 1948), 368-82; and Michael L.
Hoffman, "Problems of East-West Trade," International Conciliation, No. 511 (Janu-
ary, 1957), pp. 259-308, especially pp. 267-70.
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It is likely that the U.S.S.R. only participated in the Bretton Woods
Conference and other negotiations to maintain the necessary wartime unity
and perhaps in the hope of obtaining credits for postwar reconstruction.
The development of the cold war made it clear that this hope would not
be fulfilled.
III
The cold war increased in intensity during the second period, from
1948 through 1952, and it appears to have been the dominant factor moti-
vating Soviet policy then. During this period the U.S.S.R. continued to
abstain from most of the United Nations’ activities designed to expand
international trade. The Soviet Union did not participate in the IMF, the
IBRD, the interim organizational arrangements established to temporarily
work in the area planned for the ITO, or in the technical committees
established by the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) which could
have had a significant impact on intra-European trade. But this absention
did not preclude an active policy. On the contrary, the U.S.S.R. was
extremely active as it constantly used the United Nations as a forum from
which to attack Western international trade policies. This attack had three
main facets: one centered on the activities of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies; a second concerned the policy pursued by the United
States and other Western countries of limiting the export of strategic goods
to communist countries; and a third, while having the same ultimate target
as the second, concentrated on problems of East-West trade in Europe.
The Soviet attack on the Havana Charter illustrates the first facet of
Soviet policy. When the report on the recently completed Charter was dis-
cussed at the Economic and Social Council’s seventh session in the summer
of 1948, the Soviet delegate charged that the Havana Conference &dquo;had
produced no useful results whatever for the development of international
trade.&dquo; s He argued that the Conference failed because the industrially
developed states used it as a device to attempt to impose unfavorable trad-
ing conditions on underdeveloped countries, and because the United States
used it to assert its interests to the exclusion of those of all others. There
had been sufficient conflicts during the negotiations to make these charges
have some appeal, and they were repeated by Soviet delegates on several
other occasions in the United Nations. This Soviet attack must have exacer-
bated the inherent conflicts concerning the Havana Charter and probably
made its ratification more difficult.
Soviet delegates in the United Nations also,, attacked the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. They alleged that both were &dquo;tools&dquo; of United States foreign
policy, that both discriminated against underdeveloped and Eastern Euro-
6 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (7th Session), p. 322.
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pean countries.7 They deplored that the agreements with these agencies
gave the UN so little power and argued that the UN should have the right
to make recommendations concerning their credit activities so that the
alleged discriminations could be corrected.
The U.S.S.R. maintained that it did not participate in the Economic
Commission for Europe’s technical committees because they did not deal
with the &dquo;fundamental tasks and aims&dquo; assigned them. Soviet representa-
tives held that this was due to Anglo-American policies which sought to
&dquo;deflect the work of those bodies in such a direction as would answer to
their plans for seizing European markets and for subordinating the economy
of European countries to the political, military, and strategic interests of
those great States.&dquo; 8
The U.S.S.R., voted against, or abstained on, all United Nations’ resolu-
tions dealing with the mechanical problems of international trade on the
ground that they violated national sovereignty and were therefore ultra
vires. These resolutions concerned the elimination of double taxation, the
conclusion of a convention on customs treatment of samples and advertis-
ing, and the amelioration of problems involved in the movement of goods
and persons across national frontiers. Soviet representatives further refused
to take part in the UN’s efforts to deal with problems involved in the trans-
port of dangerous goods and attacked these activities, charging that the
problems were simply the result of the aggressive Angla-American rearrna,
ment policy.
While Soviet policy in its first facet during the period from 1948 through
1952 attacked the West indirectly by criticizing the United Nations’ activi-
ties, in its second facet Soviet policy was less circuitous. Starting with the
seventh session of the Economic and Social Council in the summer of 1948
and with the third session of the General Assembly that fall, the Soviet
Union and the satellites constantly raised the question of &dquo;discrimination in
international trade.&dquo; Representatives of these States maintained that the
Western controls on strategic exports were the most important discrimina-
tion and therefore, the chief factor limiting the expansion of international
trade. They argued that such an expansion was not only necessary for
reconstruction, but would also facilitate diplomatic and political co-opera,
tion.9
These arguments were frequently capped with the introduction of reso-
lutions condemning discrimination in international trade. Although phrased
in general terms, statements in the debate made it clear that these were
7 See for example United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records (3rd Session, Plen-
ary Meetings), p. 692.
8 United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 3/4, Corr. 3, p. 2.
9 For example, see United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 4/12, pp. 8-9.
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aimed at the United States and its principal allies None of the resole...
tions were ever adopted. However, the United Nations often did adopt
resolutions expressing the hope that trade would be expanded, and these
usually stated that this should be done on a nondiscriminatory basis. But
these resolutions were carefully phrased so that they could not constitute
a condemnation of the Western controls on strategic exports.
In the third facet of their policy the Soviets were more successful. Al-
though the ultimate target again seems to have been the controls on the
export of strategic goods, the immediate goal was the creation of special
machinery in the Economic Commission for Europe to promote intra-
European trade. This facet of Soviet policy was inaugurated at ECE’s
third session in the spring of 1948 when the U.S.S.R. proposed that ECE
establish a committee to study and make recommendations on steps to
facilitate an expansion of trade between countries of Europe and also be-
tween Europe and other areas; methods of obtaining long, and short-term
credit for use in developing European trade; and means of eliminating the
after-effects of the war.ll This proposal fell on fertile ground, for many,
including ECE’s Executive Secretary, Mr. Gunnar Myrdal, thought that
a revival of East-West trade would at least partially solve Europe’s eco-
nomic problems.
The United States and the United Kingdom, however, were skeptical.
They feared that the proposal might simply be an appeal for aid for Eastern
Europe and an attempt to have the ECE condemn the recently adopted
United States’ policy of unilaterally determining the allocation of relief
and reconstruction aid. The fact that it was linked with another proposal
providing for the creation of a subcommittee &dquo;for the Maintenance and
Development of those Branches of Industry which are most essential for
the Economy of European Cauntries&dquo; ~2 strengthened their doubts. Despite
the Anglo-American caution, there was sufficient support in the Commits-
sion to inaugurate negotiations on the establishment of a committee for the
development of trade.
The Soviets pursued three main tactics in these negotiations, which con-
tinued through the summer of 1949.13 First, they tried to link the question
of intra-Eurapean trade with that of economic development. They initially
insisted, as they had at ECE’s third session, that two committees should
10 Amazasp A. Arutiunian’s statement at the General Assembly’s third session is an
example of this: United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records (3rd session,
Second Committee), pp. 213-23.
11 United Nations Document E/ECE/79, Appendix B.
12 Ibid.
13 The negotiations ocurred in ECE’s ad hoc Committee on Industrial Development and
Trade (United Nations Document E/ECE/83); in ECE’s fourth session (United
Nations Documents E/ECE/SR. 4/9, 10, 11, 12, and 25) and in ECOSOC’s ninth
session (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records [9th session],
pp. 70-114).
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be established, one on trade and the other on economic development. The
United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, initially con-
tended that ECE’s existing technical committees could perform all the
proposed functions. Finally it was agreed that one new committee should
be established. Most members of ECE agreed with the Anglo-American
position that this committee’s mandate should be limited to trade. The
U.S.S.R.’s proposal that it &dquo;should also study and make recommendations
on measures promoting restoration and development of the industries of
European countries, especially those which have suffered from war and
occupation&dquo; failed, receiving support only from the Soviet blo,c.1’
Secondly, the U.S.S.R. attempted to secure full voting privileges for
certain states which had consultative status with ECE: Albania, Bulgaria,
Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania. The Soviet proposals were dis-
criminatory as they ignored four other states who also had similar status
with ECE: Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and Switzerland. Had these pra-
posals been adopted the U.S.S.R. would have controlled ten (or nine after
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform) of the twenty-four possible
members. Assuming that all of the eligible states might not have partici-
pated and that the Scandinavian states would have been reluctant to op-
pose the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R.’s dominance would have been assured.
Finally, on every possible occasion during the negotiations, either the
Soviet Union or one of the satellites attacked the Western controls on the
export of strategic goods. For example, the Soviet Union proposed that the
and hoc group which ECE appointed to explore the possibility of establishing
a trade committee &dquo;pronounce itself against the prohibitions and limitations
imposed on trade of the countries of Western Europe by the Marshall
Plan.&dquo; 15 This suggestion was rejected, as were all similar proposals. Only
the Soviet bloc supported them.
The U.S.S.R.’s abstention on the final vote on the terms of reference of
ECE’s Committee on the Development of Trade, as it was named, reflected
the general Soviet defeat. These terms largely represented the Anglo-
American position.
The Committee on the Development of Trade held two meetings in
1949, even before its terms of reference were finally approved. 16 Despite
Soviet protests these meetings were held in private. The two sessions ended
in deadlock. The West held that the Committee’s first task should be to
establish a clear conception of the goods available for East-West trade and
the demand for these goods. Western statesmen argued that only on the
basis of such a preliminary exchange of information could plans be evolved
14 United Nations Document E/ECE/83, p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
16 See United Nations Document E/ECE/114/Rev. 1.
680
for increased trade. As the Soviet bloc at that time was not willing to
supply any information beyond that already published, the West felt that
there was no point to continuing the discussions.
On the other hand, the Soviets maintained that the export licensing
policy practiced by the Western countries rendered any effort to develop
East-West trade futile. The U.S.S.R. and the satellites argued that the
Committee’s prime function should be to adopt resolutions against this
alleged discrimination and to force the states involved to end it. As the
West was not willing to do this, the deadlock was complete.
The most significant decisions resulting from these two sessions of the
Committee on the Development of Trade were those which gave the
Executive Secretary power to conduct studies and other activities exploring
methods to expand East-West trade. On this basis Mr. Gunnar Myrdal
continued work in this area even though no further meetings of the full
Committee were held until 1954.
Mr. Myrdal first circulated memoranda containing suggestions for a
multilateral trade agreement He thought that an agreement might in-
clude : (1) relatively long-term purchasing agreements by Western coun-
tries for cereals (and possibly other goods) from Eastern countries; (2) a
Western commitment that the proceeds of these sales could be used for the
purchase of goods on lists which would be based on mutual agreement; and
if desired, (3) arrangements for increased flexibility in payments. No
government opposed these suggestions.
Therefore, in the fall of 1950, Mr. Myrdal convened an ad hoc meeting
to explore the possibility of implementing his proposals. 18 Little came of
this conference, and Mr. Myrdal himself characterized the results as &dquo;dis-
appointing.&dquo; 19 The Soviets blamed the failure on the Western European
countries, alleging that they could not guarantee the delivery of goods be-
cause of the controls on strategic exports. The West, on the contrary, felt
that the real responsibility lay with the countries of Eastern Europe which
they claimed could not supply the needed grain.
The following year Mr. Myrdal organized an informal meeting of trade
experts from Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and the
United Kingdom in the hope - which proved illusory - that some trade
agreements might eventually develop from bilateral talks started there.
Later, he decided that it might be useful to have another consultation of
trade experts in September, 1952, and circulated an aide memoire suggest-
ing this. Although fourteen Western countries replied affirmatively, the
Soviet bloc failed to reply. Therefore, the conference was not held.
17 Ibid., p. 57.
18 See United Nations Document E/ECE/127-H.
19 United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 6/1, p. 5.
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The onus for the breakdown of the talks fell clearly on the Soviet bloc.
It was apparent that the U.S.S.R. and the satellites were not interested in
increasing trade within the existing framework. The period closed with
East-West trade at an extremely low level and with a complete deadlock
on these questions in the Economic Commission for Europe. What con-
structive work was done by the United Nations concerning international
trade was the result of co-operation solely among the non-Saviet states.
Soviet abstention from these activites was complete.
IV
As the Economic Commission for Europe had been the focus of the
deadlock between East and West on international trade, it was a logical
place for the Soviets to introduce their new policy of cooperation, and this
new policy has probably had its greatest impact in ECE. However, the new
Soviet policy has had broader aspects as well. It has also been oriented to-
ward the trade problems of underdeveloped countries and toward the
organization of global machinery to facilitate the conduct of international
trade.
The first evidence of the change in Soviet policy came January 17, 1953,
when the U.S.S.R. finally replied to Mr. Myrdal’s aide memoire of the
previous fall suggesting another trade consultation. The U.S.S.R. agreed to
participate, and this signaled the end of the deadlock in ECE. As a result,
a meeting of trade experts was held in August, 1953. The technique of
simultaneous bilateral negotiations was given its first large-scale test at this
meeting. The ECE Secretariat had long advocated this device as a possible
means of improving the system of strictly bilaterally negotiated trade agree-
ments which prevailed in postwar Europe. During these bilateral talks
Soviet representatives are said to have adopted a &dquo;business is business&dquo; atti-
tude and apparently never mentioned the export restrictions .20 The meet-
ing was generally judged a success, and it was agreed that another similar
session should be held in 1954. Since then such consultations have been
a regular feature of ECE’s work.
Further evidence of the new Soviet policy of co-operation was given at
ECE’s ninth session in the spring of 1954. The Soviet representative an-
nounced then that his government would participate in’ all of the Com-
mission’s technical committeeS,21 and by the end of the year this promise
had been fulfilled. This vastly increased the potential range of ECE’s
activities.
The Soviet delegate also proposed at ECE’s ninth session that the Corm-
mittee on the Development of Trade convene in 1954 and consider &dquo;(a)
20 Hoffman, op. cit., p. 296. See also the Executive Secretary’s report: United Nations
Document E/ECE/166.
21 United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 9/2, p. 11.
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the removal of obstacles to foreign trade; (b) the conclusion of long-term
and multilateral trade and payments agreements; (c) the convening of meet-
ings of experts on trade questions; (d) the arranging of meetings of repre-
sentatives of business circles; (e) the publication of a special bulletin on
foreign trade questions; (f) the organization of international trade fairs.&dquo; 22
In the debate, this proposal was used as a springboard for an attack on the
Western restrictions on trade with communist countries. Despite this, the
Soviet record in the 1953 trade consultation and the subject’s natural appeal
provided sufficient inducement for most Western delegates, and the Soviet
resolution was adopted in a modified form.23
The Committee on the Development of Trade convened in the fall
of 1954, and this group has also held regular meetings since then. It has
recently concentrated primarily on four issues concerning East-West trade:
(1) long-term trade agreements, (2) improvement of payments arrange-
ments, (3) standardization of general conditions of sale, and (4) arbitration
of commercial disputes. Although few concrete accomplishments appear to
have resulted from the Committee’s discussions, the ground work possibly
has been laid for later action.
While Soviet representatives participated actively and constructively
in these meetings of the Committee on the Development of Trade and in
the meetings of ECE’s subsidiary organs generally, in ECE’s public, plenary
sessions they continue their attacks on the West’s control of strategic
exports.24 In terms of formal impact - resolutions adopted by ECE - these
attacks have had no effect. Only the Soviet bloc supported the U.S.S.R.’s
proposals that ECE condemn the Western controls. However, the informal,
psychological impact of the Soviet attack has probably been greater. It
certainly must have contributed to the growing feeling in Western Europe
against the restrictions.
The new Soviet policy in ECE reached a climax in the spring of 1956 at
the eleventh session when the U.S.S.R. proposed that negotiations be in-
itiated concerning an all-European economic agreement; the creation of an
ECE subsidiary organ to deal with peaceful uses of atomic energy; and the
elaboration of recommendations for developing business contacts between
countries of Eastern and Western Europe.25 The Commission did not act
22 United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 9/6, p. 20.
23 See United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (18th session), Sup-
plement No. 3, "Economic Commission for Europe: Annual Report," p. 20.
24 See the speech of the Soviet representative at ECE’s tenth session in the spring of 1955
(United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 10/8, pp. 4-6) and the proposal he made
then (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records [20th session],
Supplement No. 3, "Economic Commission for Europe: Annual Report," p. 44). See
also the Soviet delegate’s speech at ECE’s eleventh session (United Nations Docu-
ment E/ECE/SR. 11/5, pp. 5-13.
25 United Nations Document E/ECE/243.
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substantively on the first two proposals; it merely asked the U.S.S.R. to
expand them and the Executive Secretary to solicit member states’ views.26
These proposals were introduced and discussed again at ECE’s twelfth ses-
sion in May, 1957,27 but the results were similarly inconclusive. The
U.S.S.R.’s third proposal concerning business contacts was adopted at
ECE’s eleventh session, but in a broadened form covering increased con-
tacts generally.
One of the motivations responsible for the new Soviet proposals ap-
parently was the perennial desire to attack the strategic export ban. In
introducing them, the Soviet representative stated that further efforts were
needed for the &dquo;speedy elimination of artificial barriers&dquo; to East-West
trade.28 Another motivation may have been a desire to block progress for-
ward integration in Western Europe. The first two Soviet proposals cover
exactly the same areas as the treaties for a European Economic Community
and a European Atomic Energy Community, and they must have been
posed as alternatives to these treaties.
A second, broader aspect of the new Soviet policy concerns the trade
problems of underdeveloped areas. In the past few years the U.S.S.R. has
made a major effort to woo the underdeveloped countries and as a part of
this strategy trade between the Soviet bloc and these countries has been
vastly increased. The Soviets used the UN in 1954 as a convenient forum
from which they could announce their new willingness (and ability) to en-
gage in trade.29 Soviet representatives stated that the U.S.S.R. would be
willing to supply industrial equipment and machinery to the underdevel-
oped countries on the basis of long-term agreements. They offered ex-
tremely attractive credit arrangements, including the possibility of repay-
ment in local currencies. These offers had considerable appeal in view of
the difficulties the underdeveloped countries faced in obtaining needed
equipment, and they were the prelude to several trade agreements.
In 1954 the Soviet Union also supported the Economic and Social
Council’s decision to establish a Commission on International Commodity
Trade. The underdeveloped countries had wanted to establish such a cam-
mission for sometime, but their efforts had been blocked by the developed
countries of the West, who continued their opposition even after the Com-
mission’s creation.3° Generally, the U.S.S.R. has been more sympathetic
26 See United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (22nd session),
Supplement No. 6, "Economic Commission for Europe: Annual Report," pp. 32-33.
27 New York Times, May 4, 1957, p. 3.
28 United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 11/5, p. 10.
29 See the Soviet delegates’ speeches at ECAFE’s tenth session (United Nations Document
E/CN. 11/389, pp. 54-56), and ECOSOC’s seventeenth session (United Nations,
Economic and Social Council, Official Records [17th session], pp. 231-32).
30 Belgium, France, Norway, the United States, and the United Kingdom all voted against
the establishment of this Commission (United Nations, Economic and Social Council,
Official Records [17th session], p. 234).
684
than the West to the underdeveloped countries’ position concerning prob-
lems of commodity trade. During this same period the Soviet Union also
began to participate in the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance, and this further contributed to the growing rapprochement on
economic questions between the U.S.S.R. and the underdeveloped countries.
In addition, the U.S.S.R. developed a new propaganda attack in the
UN oriented toward the underdeveloped areas. This attack’s theme was
that the restrictions on the export of strategic goods - particularly those
against China - interfered with the growth of the underdeveloped coun-
tries’ economies. Arguing from this premise, Soviet delegates introduced
new resolutions condemning discrimination in international trade. These
were passed, but only after they were modified so as not to imply a can-
demnation of Western palicy.31
On balance, in terms of the growing trade between the underdeveloped
countries and the Soviet bloc and the increasing alignment of the Soviet
bloc and the underdeveloped countries in the United Nations’ debates on
international trade, this second aspect of the new Soviet policy seems to
have been relatively successful.
The third aspect of the new Soviet policy concerns global machinery to
facilitate the conduct of international trade. The West had hoped that the
International Trade Organization would provide the basic organizational
structure in this area, but the Havana Charter never came into force, and as
time passed the West was forced to develop other machinery. On a global
level the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT - the one con-
crete product of the negotiations concerning the drafting of the ITO
Charter) was expanded into a semi-permanent organization.32 This ar-
rangement, however, was not completely satisfactory. Its apparent tempo-
rary nature caused uncertainty in some states, and its structure was weak.
Consequently it was proposed that an Organization for Trade Cooperation
(OTC) be created, using the GATT structure as a base. In the spring of
1955 the text of the OTC agreement was completed and submitted to the
members of GATT for ratification. According to it, states could not join
OTC unless they accepted the obligations of GATT and were accepted by
GATT. This rule, at least for the present, would preclude the Soviet Union
and the satellites.32a Some of the new Soviet actions might therefore be inter-
preted as countermoves against this exclusion.
31 See Economic and Social Council Resolution 531 C(XVIII) and General Assembly
Resolution 830 (IX).
32 This development is described in Raymond Vernon’s "Organizing for World Trade,"
International Conciliation, No. 505 (November, 1955), pp. 163-222; and in two
reports by the United Nations Secretariat: United Nations Documents E/2737 ("The
Quest for Freer Trade"), and E/2897.
32a Whether it will continue to do so in the future is problematical. Poland recently applied
for membership in GATT, and its application will be considered at GATT’s next ses-
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Certainly this interpretation partially explains a series of Soviet actions
inaugurated at the Economic and Social Council’s twentieth session in the
summer of 1955. The Soviet representative announced then that the
U.S.S.R. was willing to support the Havana Charter and proposed that the
Council appeal to member states to ratify the Charter.33 At the same time,
he stated that GATT would never be a suitable agency for the conduct of
trade negotiations on a global level because its membership was limited.
As he also claimed that further efforts were required to eliminate export
restrictions, it seems reasonable to infer that this action was in addition de-
signed to provide a new vehicle through which to attack the strategic export
controls. Although the Soviet proposal was not accepted, two resolutions
were adopted at the twentieth session concerning the organization of ma-
chinery to facilitate world trade.34 They insured that the subject would
be discussed again the following year and asked the Secretary-General to
develop relevant studies meanwhile.
When discussion resumed at ECOSOC’s twenty-second session, the
Soviet Union dropped her appeal for ratification of the Havana Charter
and proposed instead that an ad hoc committee be established to study and
make recommendations on the creation of an international organization for
trade co-operation.35 The Soviet delegate held that such an organization
should be open equally to members and non-members of the United Na-
tions and that it should work for the elimination of all discriminatory
restrictions in trade.36 Similar proposals have been made since then by
Yugoslavia and Poland at the eleventh session of the General Assembly last
winter and by the then Foreign Minister Demitri Shepilov in a speech be-
fore the Supreme Soviet February 12, 1957. Both of these latter proposals
also involved the convocation of a world economic conference.
To date none of these suggestions have been accepted, and at the
General Assembly’s eleventh session when the Polish-Yugoslav proposal
was put in juxtaposition to a Western proposal favoring the ratification of
OTC, the latter won easily. But the Soviet Union and the satellites have
set forth an alternative concept of machinery to facilitate the conduct of
world trade which will certainly be raised and discussed again. This alterna-
sion in October, 1958. If the application is accepted it will be the first time that this
privilege has been extended to a communist state, for although Czechoslovakia is a
member of GATT, it joined before falling completely under communist control. The
Polish application might be a test case, and if successful, it could conceivably be fol-
lowed by one from the U.S.S.R. For this reason, and because it involves admitting a
communist state to what previously was a "private-enterprise club," the Polish applica-
tion has profound implications for GATT.
33 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (20th session), pp.
76-77.
34 Economic and Social Council Resolutions 579 A (XX) and 592 (XX).
35 United Nations Document E/L. 734. 
36 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (22nd session), p. 104.
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tive remains a threat to the West should its efforts to construct machinery
in this area falter; and the longer the ratification of OTC is postponed, the
greater this threat becomes.
The type of organizational machinery concerning international trade that
the U.S.S.R. would prefer - and probably would work toward if given the
opportunity - can perhaps be seen by examining a second course of action
which the Soviets pursued as a part of this aspect of their new policy. This
course of action was introduced at the ninth session of the Economic Com-
mission for Europe in the spring of 1954 when Czechoslovakia, with strong
Soviet support, proposed that ECE explore the possibility of extending the
technique of simultaneous bilateral negotiations to an interregional level.37
Despite skepticism, the Czechoslovakian resolution was adopted in a modi-
fied form, and similar resolutions were later passed in ECOSOC and
ECAFE. Finally, at the insistence of the Soviet bloc, in 1955 ECOSOC
authorized the convocation of the interregional trade negotiatio~ns.38 As yet
no such negotiations have been held; however, they remain a possibility and
an alternative approach to the problems of international trade.
V
The change in Soviet policy in relation to the United Nations’ work
concerning international trade in part merely reflects developments in the
economies of the Soviet Union and the satellites. The fundamental probe
lem of the Eastern economies in the early postwar years was reconstruction,
and the United Nations as it developed could contribute little to this.
Furthermore, the Soviet elite apparently wanted the satellites to reorient
their economies internally by giving greater emphasis to industrial produc-
tion, and externally by directing their foreign trade more toward one another
and toward the U.S.S.R. Participation in the United Nations’ activities
would not have aided in achieving this; it might even have interfered. By
1953, however, the Eastern economies had recovered from the war and had
made substantial further progress. The desired reorientation had also
occurred.39 The U.S.S.R. and the satellites were then free to concentrate
on other objectives and to expand their international trade on a new basis
if they desired.
The decision to take advantage of this opportunity may have been
prompted primarily by internal considerations. The willingness to engage
in trade and to co-operate in this area of the United Nations’ work, may
simply have been a product of the new Soviet elite’s desire to consolidate
its power through raising living standards. The composition of the expanded
37 United Nations Document E/ECE/SR. 9/10, pp. 8-12.
38 Economic and Social Council Resolution 579 B (XX).
39 See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in
1954 (Geneva, 1955), chaps. 2, 3, and 5.
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trade indicates that this probably was a factor. This new policy may also
have been chosen as a means of reducing world tensions and thereby allow-
ing the new elite to concentrate more on internal problems.
But it is possible that the Soviet Union would have taken advantage of
the new opportunity and changed its policy in the UN even if Stalin had
lived, and without reference to internal considerations. Indeed, the first
indication of the change in ECE came before Stalin’s death. Further, the
change was to some extent foreshadowed by the events of the Nineteenth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by Stalin’s
major address there. If Soviet policy through 1952 can be interpreted
largely as an attack on the West, this attack had failed. While Soviet
speeches and proposals had some effect at first, by 1952 their hollowness
had been exposed. New tactics were also needed after 1952 because the
situation had changed. Through the Organization for European Economic
Co.-operation, the European Coal and Steel Community, and other devices,
Western Europe moved, however fitfully, toward integration. The West
also progressed in the construction of global machinery to facilitate the con-
duct of trade. As neither development included the Soviet bloc, it seems
plausible to assume that the U.S.S.R. should attempt countermoves. Thus
the new Soviet policy may simply be a continuation of the older attack on
the West through new, more subtle means in a new situation.
While new targets have been added to the Soviet attack - integration
in Western Europe and GATT and OTC - the prime target remains the
West’s ban on strategic exports. On the surface it appears that the Soviet
Union desires very much to eliminate this ban. However, while Soviet
representatives constantly criticize the ban on strategic exports, they also
point out that it has had no effect on the economic growth of the Soviet
Union and the satellites. Although their contention would be difficult to
substantiate, it is possible that the strategic export ban may have speeded
the development of certain aspects of the Eastern economies by forcing the
Soviets to develop internal sources of supply. When the ban was relaxed
in 1954 the Eastern countries did not immediately purchase significant
quantities of most of the goods taken off the controlled list.4° Perhaps then
there is a deeper motivation for this Soviet attack, which might also yield a
more comprehensive explanation for Soviet policy. It may be that the
Soviet Union attacked the strategic export ban as much from a desire
to exacerbate relations among Western states, as from a desire to eliminate
the prohibition, and that this desire to increase tensions in the West is the
motivation for all of Soviet policy in the UN concerning international trade.
40 See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Bulletin for Europe,
VIII (August, 1956), pp. 48, 56-59. Of course this may merely mean that the relaxation
was carefully planned so as not to include goods which the East actually desired, as
Soviet representatives have frequently charged.
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If it is, Soviet policy has frequently achieved its objective, and the recent
changes in this policy enhance the possibility of its continuing to do so.
At the same time, the new Soviet policy has resulted in increased trade
between the Soviet bloc and some Western countries and has allowed the
UN (especially ECE) to expand its work. This is no doubt immediately
important, but its long-range significance is questionable. There is little
evidence that communist theories concerning the role of external trade -
at least with noncommunist countries - have changed. Furthermore, al-
though the Soviet Union has increased its participation in the United
Nations, it has not been willing to join the IMF, the IBRD, GATT, or
OTC, and has not significantly changed its narrow definition of national
sovereignty concerning the UN’s more technical activities. The activities
which the Soviet Union has participated in generally have been conducted
on a different basis from that originally planned for the UN. They have
been, as in ECE, more oriented toward bilateralism than multilateralism,
and although Soviet representatives are now less forceful in asserting the
superiority of the former technique, their practice is evidence of their con-
tinuing preference.
If the Soviet Union expands its role in the United Nations’ activities
in relation to world trade, a greater shift in the direction of bilateralism will
probably result. The U.S.S.R.’s actions and the alternatives it currently
poses imply this. It may be, as some have suggested, that the goal of
multilateralism as envisaged by the United Nations’ planners was inappro-
priate for the conditions of the mid-twentieh century.41 Continuing pres-
sures against this goal from the underdeveloped countries and the countries
with advanced welfare-type economies, as well as from the Soviet bloc, in-
dicate that it was. Still, the basic values of multilateralism have not
changed, and they remain valid for the West. The challenge presented by
the Soviet alternatives is therefore one that should be met, and it has been
to date. To continue to meet it, the West will require a policy equally as
active and flexible as the U.S.S.R.’s.
41 See Leicester Webb, "The Future of International Trade." World Politics, V (July,
1953), 423-42.
